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Notches --- where small changes in behavior lead to large changes in a tax or subsidy --- figure prominently
in many policies, but have been rarely examined by economists. In this paper, we analyze a class of
notches associated with policies aimed at improving vehicle fuel economy. We provide several pieces
of evidence showing that automakers respond to notches in fuel economy policy by precisely manipulating
fuel economy ratings so as to just qualify for more favorable treatment. We then describe the welfare
consequences of this behavior and derive a welfare summary statistic applicable to many contexts.
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Notches | where small changes in behavior lead to large changes in tax liability or the amount
of a subsidy | gure prominently in many policies. These notches imply large, capriciously
varying, local incentives to make small changes in behavior for relatively large private, but not
social, rewards. Such behavioral responses erode the intended welfare benets of policies, whose
notch features are presumably justied by the increased salience and administrative convenience
of policies that appear as step functions rather than smooth, continuous schedules.
In this paper we investigate these issues by focusing on notches in policies intended to
encourage the production and use of fuel-ecient vehicles, what we call car notches. Key
aspects of U.S. and Canadian policy toward motor vehicle fuel economy feature such notches.
For example, under the U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax, a car with a 14.5 miles-per-gallon (MPG) rating
is subject to a $4,500 tax, while a car with a 14.4 MPG rating (and as low as 13.5) is subject to
a $5,400 tax, so that a tax increase of $900 is triggered by a decrease of just 0.1 MPG. Under the
Canadian EcoAuto rebate program, cars that consume less than 5.5 liters of gasoline per 100
kilometers (L/100km) qualify for a $2,000 rebate, but a vehicle that consumers 5.6 L/100km
(up to 6.0) receives just a $1,000 rebate.
Policy notches have a bad reputation among economists, for the reason mentioned already.
Only Blinder and Rosen (1985) have risen to their defense. In the context of encouraging the
consumption of a socially desirable good, they show via simulation that when general non-
linear Pigouvian subsidies cannot be used in a world with multiple heterogeneous individuals,
a single-notch program can improve the ratio of induced incremental consumption to either
revenue cost, welfare, or revenue cost plus welfare cost, as compared to a linear subsidy. Their
intuition is that, \by targeting the subsidy to those whose tastes for the favored commodity are
relatively insensitive, the notch subsidy does not \waste" money on those whose consumption
is not stimulated much" (p. 742). The notch is a non-linear subsidy that can, depending on
the distribution of tastes, economize on the revenue loss from subsidizing inframarginal con-
sumption, but it is an inecient tool when used as a simple approximation a smooth schedule.
In spite of the folk wisdom that they are sub-optimal, policy notches are ubiquitous. Tax
1notches include the U.S. Saver's Credit, which provides a tax credit equal to a percentage
of contributions to retirement savings accounts, where the credit rate is a notch function of
adjusted gross income (Ramnath 2009), and the U.K. Family Credit, which applies only to
families that have one adult working 16 or more hours per week (Blundell 2000). Many social
programs have eligibility notches in the form of age requirements or means tests. Notches in
time (a policy change takes eect on a specic date) and space (a policy changes at the border
of a county, state or country) are present in most policies.
As Slemrod (2010) discusses, notches may be justied by administrative simplicity or en-
hanced salience. However, policy notches also induce actors to change their behavior just
enough to be situated on the benecial side of a notch. In the case of car notches, a vehicle
manufacturer may have an incentive to re-engineer its cars so as to just qualify for a more ad-
vantageous policy category. Notched policies may also trigger the introduction of qualitatively
new products, what Kleven and Slemrod (2009) call tax-driven product innovation. They note
that in Indonesia, the preferential tax treatment of motorcycles relative to autos led to the
creation of a new type of motorcycle with three wheels and long benches at the back seating up
to eight passengers|car-like but not so car-like as to be taxed as a car. When Chile imposed
much higher taxes on cars than on panel trucks, manufacturers soon oered a redesigned panel
truck that featured glass windows instead of panels and upholstered seats in the back.1
Although presumably the fuel economy policies of the U.S. and Canada are motivated by
an externality argument, so that some re-engineering is part of an anticipated and desirable
response, the lumpy nature of the responses to policy notches is, ceteris paribus, an inecient
way to reduce the external costs of fuel consumption. In this paper we study the behavioral
responses to the U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax and Canadian feebate programs and examine the welfare
consequence of these programs.2
We also address another notch-like aspect of fuel economy policy|publicly disclosed and
1These examples are drawn from Harberger (1995).
2Many countries have notched automobile policies. For example, Sweden oers rebates up to e4000 when
purchasing a hybrid car with CO2 emissions below 120 grams per kilometer. Malaysia has notched registration
and fuel subsidies that depend on engine displacement. In the U.K., the annual vehicle tax is a notched schedule
determined by CO2 emissions. Before 2001, it was a notched schedule in engine size, which may explain why
there are so many cars with 1399cc engines.
2highly visible fuel economy ratings that are designed to provide information to prospective
vehicle purchasers. In the U.S., regulations require that automakers disclose fuel economy
ratings to consumers and that these ratings be reported as integers. This means that, just
as for the Gas Guzzler Taxes and feebate system, an underlying continuous fuel economy
measure is transformed into coarser categories by policy. To the extent that consumer demand
depends on the publicized ratings, and not on the underlying tests|a plausible assumption,
given the diculty of obtaining and interpreting these underlying test data|manufacturers
have an incentive to re-engineer vehicles to achieve a higher integer rating.
Tax economists have recently taken interest in the study of kinks|points where a policy
causes a discrete change in the slope of a tax, arguing that the extent of bunching can identify
structural parameters of utility functions.3 Often, empirical estimates have shown a more muted
behavioral response to kinks than would be suggested by theory. The incentives surrounding
notches are frequently much starker, suggesting that notches may prove more useful than kinks
in uncovering behavioral parameters. A systematic study of the dierence between kinks and
notches may also shed light on phenomena related to some form of bounded rationality | if
agents respond to notches but not kinks, a leading explanation might be salience.4
We begin in Section 2 by describing U.S. and Canadian fuel economy policies and the notches
they create. In Section 3 we describe our data. Our empirical analysis begins in Section 4.
There, we rst show histograms of the distribution of fuel economy ratings for vehicles subject
to the U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax. We nd evidence of local fuel economy response, as evidenced by
a statistically signicant number of \extra" vehicles with fuel economy ratings just on the tax-
preferred side of notches. We also show that vehicles with higher sales volume are more likely
to lie on the tax-favorable side of a notch, and that there is signicant bunching above the top
Gas Guzzler Tax notch. We also show that the data pass falsication tests. Finally, we show
evidence that automakers strategically responded to the introduction of the Canadian feebate
program by modifying vehicles close to tax notches. Taken together, this evidence strongly
3For example, see Saez (2010).
4Chetty, Friedman, Olsen and Pistaferri (2009) develop an explanation of the observed response to kinked
budget sets based on optimization frictions.
3supports our hypothesis that automakers do respond to local notch incentives by strategically
altering fuel economy ratings.
In Section 5 we turn to a welfare analysis of notches. First, we show that, under some
simplifying assumptions there is a simple statistic, what we call the average eective tax rate
around a notch, that summarizes how local manipulation distorts the intended eects of a
corrective tax. Second, we demonstrate that this value, in conjunction with ex post aggregate
data, determines a measure of the local welfare cost of using a notched policy. Third, we
calculate this for the Gas Guzzler Tax data, concluding that the welfare benets from local
manipulation are negative.
In Section 6 we provide evidence that automakers also manipulate vehicle fuel economy in
response to presentation notches created by rounding rules in fuel economy label regulations.
This not only provides additional evidence of automaker response to notches, but it also implies
that consumers value fuel economy. In Section 7 we relate the degree of bunching around Gas
Guzzler Tax notches and fuel economy label notches to estimate this consumer valuation. We
rst show that there is greater manipulation around notches of greater tax value, and then relate
the amount of bunching around the Gas Guzzler Tax to the amount around fuel economy labels
in order to infer the consumer valuation of fuel economy. Section 8 concludes.
2 Fuel Economy Policy and Presentation Notches
2.1 The U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax
When in 1978 the U.S. introduced the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, it
also enacted the Gas Guzzler Tax, which penalizes cars with low fuel economy. The amount
of the tax is a notched schedule in fuel economy, so vehicles with very small ratings dierences
may be subject to discretely dierent taxes. The tax was phased in between 1980 and 1991,
but the schedule has not changed since. However, because the tax is not adjusted for ination,
the real value has eroded. Table 1 shows the schedule over time.
Light trucks, a designation that includes pickup trucks, sport-utility vehicles and vans,
4Table 1: Gas Guzzler Tax Rates Over Time (Dollars Per Car)
Vehicle fuel
economy (MPG) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986-90 1991+
Over 22.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22.0{22.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 1,000
21.5{21.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 1,000
21.0{21.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 650 1,300
20.5{20.9 0 0 0 0 0 500 650 1,300
20.0{20.4 0 0 0 0 0 500 850 1,700
19.5{19.9 0 0 0 0 0 600 850 1,700
19.0{19.4 0 0 0 0 450 600 1,050 2,100
18.5{18.9 0 0 0 350 450 800 1,050 2,100
18.0{18.4 0 0 200 350 600 800 1,300 2,600
17.5{17.9 0 0 200 500 600 1,000 1,300 2,600
17.0{17.4 0 0 350 500 750 1,000 1,500 3,000
16.5{16.9 0 200 350 650 750 1,200 1,500 3,000
16.0{16.4 0 200 450 650 950 1,200 1,850 3,700
15.5{15.9 0 350 450 800 950 1,500 1,850 3,700
15.0{15.4 0 350 600 800 1,150 1,500 2,250 4,500
14.5{14.9 200 450 600 1,000 1,150 1,800 2,250 4,500
14.0{14.4 200 450 750 1,000 1,450 1,800 2,700 5,400
13.5{13.9 300 550 750 1,250 1,450 2,200 2,700 5,400
13.0{13.4 300 550 950 1,250 1,750 2,200 3,200 6,400
12.5{12.9 550 650 950 1,550 1,750 2,650 3,200 6,400
Under 12.4 550 650 1,200 1,550 2,150 2,650 3,850 7,700
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Form 6197. All values are nominal.
were exempted from the tax from its inception, originally with the intention of not penalizing
vehicles used for farming and commercial purposes. Because the Gas Guzzler Tax applies only
to vehicles with low fuel economy and does not apply to light trucks, a small fraction of the
market is subject to the tax. Aected vehicles tend to be high-priced, high-performance cars
with relatively low sales volumes. In 2008, 77 (out of 1,248) vehicle congurations { a unique
engine (including cylinders and displacement) and transmission { were subject to the tax, which
raised about $172 million in revenue.5 The tax is remitted by manufacturers, but it is visible
to consumers because it appears as a separate item on the sticker price.
The fuel economy ratings used to determine tax liability are based on fuel economy tests
specied by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Automakers \drive" a test vehicle
through a specied course on a dynamometer (essentially a treadmill for cars), during which
the vehicle's exhaust emissions are captured. The amount of fuel consumed during the trial is
5Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Historical Table 20.
5Figure 1: A Sample Fuel Economy Label
Source: Environmental Protection Agency.
determined based on the quantity of several gases captured from the exhaust. Two dierent
\courses" are used to generate separate ratings for a city and highway test. The highway and
city ratings are harmonically averaged to create a single Gas Guzzler Tax rating. These same
tests are also used to determine fuel economy label ratings, CAFE ratings, and for emissions
regulations. Each rating involves a slightly dierent transformation of the underlying test
results, so that a vehicle may be near a notch for one rating system but not for others.
2.2 Fuel Economy Label Ratings
Every new vehicle sold in the United States is required to display a label that details the
vehicle's MSRP, and since 1978 this label must also include the vehicle's ocial EPA highway
and city fuel economy ratings. The font size each label item is mandated by law, and the city
and highway fuel economy ratings must be set in the largest font, making these by far the most
prominent numbers on the label. In a much smaller font, the label also displays the combined
rating, a graphic that compares the vehicle to others in its class, and an estimate of the annual
cost of gasoline. Figure 1 is an example of the current fuel economy label in the United States.
The city and highway ratings are integers, which are determined by rounding o the under-
lying fuel economy estimate derived from the test procedure. This rounding creates what we
6call a presentation notch | where a marginal dierence in an underlying characteristic creates
a discrete change in the information transmitted in the marketplace. A vehicle with a highway
fuel economy rating of 29.49 will be listed as 29 on the label, whereas a vehicle with a rating
of 29.50 will be listed as 30.
If consumers value fuel economy, and if they use the ocial EPA ratings as a source of
information, then rms may undertake costly adjustment procedures to increase the fuel econ-
omy rating as displayed on the labels, just as they would respond to tax notches.6 The label
ratings are based on the same tests used to derive the Gas Guzzler Tax rating. Prior to 1986,
the reported label rating was simply the integer nearest the value resulting from the test pro-
cedure.7 Starting in 1986, the EPA modied the procedure to adjust for \in-use shortfall", in
response to the fact that consumers consistently reported lower average actual fuel economy
than suggested by the labels. After attempting to measure the discrepancy, the EPA decided
to adjust the test numbers by simply multiplying the test output by a xed factor|0.9 for the
city and 0.78 for the highway test. The product is then rounded to the nearest integer for the
label.8 Automakers do have the right to adjust the label ratings downwards if they wish, and a
very small percentage of ratings do reect a downward adjustment, so that the test procedure
indicates a higher value than appears on the label in practice. The automakers may do this to
avoid consumer displeasure if actual fuel economy experiences fall short of their expectations.
Fuel economy labels are assigned according to basic engine and transmission. Thus, separate
label ratings are not reported for vehicles that share a basic engine and transmission but have
dierent vehicle weights. Testing is required, however, for each vehicle with a dierent weight,
and the test results are combined via a sales-weighted harmonic average.9
6The unrounded gures are public information (indeed, we make use of these data in subsequent analysis),
and so in principle consumers could also obtain and consider these unrounded numbers. To do so, however,
they would have to download the publicly available fuel economy data les; the unrounded numbers are not
included in the fuel economy guide that is available at dealerships and on the EPA's website. Even with these
les in hand, a car shopper would need to know how to adjust for a factor called \in-use shortfall" in order to
convert the unrounded numbers. We think this is unlikely, but if consumers do nd the unrounded information,
we would not expect automakers to respond to label notches, which we test directly below.
7The EPA uses ASTM International rounding, which rounds a value ending in exactly 0.50 to the nearest
even integer.
8Starting in 2008, the EPA instituted a new testing procedure, which is designed to improve the accuracy of
label ratings. In this paper, we investigate only models that were tested during the pre-2008 regime.
9Tests are not performed on every model separately if models share the same basic engine, transmission and
7Table 2: Rebate and Tax Thresholds in the Canadian Feebate Program
Fuel Economy Rebate Tax
L/100km MPG Equivalent Cars Light Trucks Flexible-Fuel Cars, Vans
Vehicles and SUVs
5.5 or less 42.8 or more $2,000
5.6 - 6.0 42.0 - 39.2 1,500
6.1 - 6.5 38.6 - 36.2 1,000
7.3 or less 32.2 or more $2,000
7.4 - 7.8 31.8 - 30.2 1,500
7.9 - 8.3 29.8 - 28.3 1,000
13.0 or less 18.1 or more $1,000
13.0 - 13.9 18.1 - 17.0 $1,000
14.0 - 14.9 16.8 - 15.8 2,000
15.0 - 15.9 15.7 - 14.8 3,000
16.0 and over 14.7 or less 4,000
Note: The feebate program measures fuel economy in L/100km. To facilitate comparison with
the U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax, we show the miles-per-gallon equivalent.
2.3 The Canadian Feebate Program
In March 2007, the Canadian government introduced two new notched fuel economy programs.
The rst was called the Green Levy, which taxed particularly fuel-inecient vehicles. As with
the Gas Guzzler Tax, pickup trucks were exempted, but sport-utility vehicles and vans were
subject to the tax. As shown in Table 2, the maximum tax was $4,000. In the 2008 model
year, 156 (out of 1071) distinct vehicle congurations were taxed. Because many of the vehicles
subject to the tax are low-volume, high-performance vehicles, the taxed vehicles comprise a
larger fraction of models than their share of the total sales volume, which was 2% in 2008.
The second policy, called the EcoAuto rebate program, was introduced simultaneously. It
provided rebates for vehicles with particularly good fuel economy. Unlike the Green Levy, the
EcoAuto program was designed to be a temporary measure, set to expire after two years. As a
result, the program was in eect from March 20, 2007 to December 31, 2008, and only vehicles
in model years 2006, 2007 and 2008 were eligible to receive the rebate. In the 2008 model year,
only 32 vehicle congurations qualied out of 1071 vehicle congurations, but these vehicles
enjoyed an 8% market share. Together the rebate and the tax comprise a version of what is
weight. For example, a Mercury Mountaineer is identical to a Ford Escape in engine, transmission and weight.
As a result, Ford Motor Company would test only one of the two models.
8sometimes called a feebate | a set of taxes and rebates that together act to encourage the
purchase of more fuel-ecient vehicles. The rebate program cost $191.2 million on the program
over two years, but the magnitudes of the two programs were expected to be roughly osetting,
making the combined policy revenue-neutral.
In Canada, fuel economy ratings are measured as liters of gasoline consumed per 100 kilo-
meters (L/100km), which diers from MPG both in units and in inverting the ratio of fuel to
distance traveled. The fuel economy ratings used in Canada are based on test procedures that
are nearly identical to the ones used in the United States. Cars that consume less than 6.5
L/100km were eligible for a subsidy of at least $1,000. Light trucks, including pickups, SUVs
and vans, were subsidized if they consume less than 8.3 L/100km. Flexible-fuel vehicles |
vehicles capable of running either on conventional gasoline or a fuel blend known as E85 that is
85% ethanol | that got 13L/100km or better were eligible for a $1,000 rebate. All vehicles in
the eligible vehicle classes were subject to the tax if they consume above 13 L/100km. Starting
at $1,000, the tax rose by $1,000 for each integer increase in L/100km, for a maximum of $4,000.
Table 2 summarizes these policies. The current values of both the Canadian policies and the
Gas Guzzler Tax are also plotted in Figure 2.
The introduction of the feebate program in March 2007 was said to be a surprise to au-
tomakers and consumers alike. This provides an opportunity to examine automaker response
to notches by comparing 2007 model year vehicles, which were designed and tested before the
policy was revealed, and 2008 and 2009 model year vehicles, which could have been modied
in response to the policy. We take this up in section 4.5.
2.4 How Is Fuel Economy Manipulated?
Our analysis is based on the premise that automakers perform local manipulation of fuel econ-
omy ratings in order to move over a tax or presentation notch. If an automaker wishes to boost
fuel economy locally around a notch, how is this done?
First, automakers may simply repeat the underlying fuel economy test if there is sucient
variability across trials. U.S. regulation requires, however, that all valid tests must be reported
9Figure 2: The U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax and the Canadian Feebate Program in 2008
and averaged, limiting the ecacy of this strategy.
Second, each \model type" receives a single rating, but a single model type may involve
several test vehicles of dierent weights, which are then averaged to create a single rating.
Automaker could produce less of one conguration and more of the other to move the average
rating, which determines the tax liability for all vehicles in a model type, but this is likely to
be an expensive strategy.
Finally, an automaker may modify a vehicle to improve its fuel economy. Methods include
\light-weighting" (substituting vehicle parts to reduce weight), engine recalibration (reprogram-
ming the vehicle to operate in a dierent gear at certain speeds), use of low-friction lubricants,
modications to tires, or small aerodynamic changes such as the addition of a spoiler, side
skirts, air dam reshaping, or the installation of \belly pans" that smooth air ow by covering
parts underneath the vehicle.10 It is important to distinguish these methods from what one
might characterize as global design choices. The overall structure of the engine, weight, the
10These examples are drawn from Edmunds.com and National Research Council (2002). Aerodynamics inu-
ence fuel economy ratings because testers take vehicles on an actual driving course and \coast" the vehicle to
tests its aerodynamic eciency. The results are used to make small modications to the dynamometer output.
10shape of the car, the use of fuel saving technologies and the choice of transmission are all key
determinants of fuel economy, but these decisions are made on a several year time horizon,
long before vehicles are ocially tested and the exact location of a vehicle vis- a-vis a notch
is known.11 In contrast, the relatively minor adjustments we listed above could potentially be
adopted late in the production cycle, in response to preliminary test results.
Automakers are reluctant to publicize information about how local fuel economy adjustment
might occur or say whether they respond to notches. However, our conversations with experts
who have worked for automakers and ocials at the EPA indicate that this type of vehicle
modication does indeed take place. Anecdotal evidence from the popular press also provides
support. Canadian media reported that automakers intentionally altered some vehicles' fuel
economy in response to the feebate (Keenan 2007a). In 2009, when the recent cash-for-clunkers
bill was passed, Nissan stated its intention to alter fuel economy for certain models to ensure
that they met fuel economy eligibility requirements (Greimel 2009). Another oft-cited example
concerns what is known as Computer Aided Gear Selection, sometimes called a \skip shift",
which forces a manual transmission vehicle into a rst-to-fourth gear shift at certain speeds.
Popular consensus is that this feature is installed as a way of reducing the Gas Guzzler Tax,
and kits are available that claim to disable this feature. In the remainder of the paper, we
empirically test for evidence of this strategic manipulation, and this background provides a
plausible interpretation of our results.
3 Data Sources
We gathered fuel economy data from several sources. For the Gas Guzzler Tax, we obtained
from the Internal Revenue Service a complete list of all vehicles that were subject to the tax
from the beginning of the program in 1980. These data include fuel economy ratings to a tenth
of a mile-per-gallon, and are limited to the set of vehicles that were actually taxed, but are
complete for all years between 1980 and 2009.
11Longer-horizon global choices are examined by Klier and Linn (2008), Knittel (2009) and Whitefoot, Fowlie
and Skerlos (2010).
11We complement this data with fuel economy ratings from the EPA, which provides un-
rounded city and highway test results from 1978 to 1983 and from 1999 to 2007. We use these
underlying test statistics to reconstruct the Gas Guzzler Tax rating for all vehicles using the
formulas published in federal regulations. The EPA data have the advantage of allowing us to
calculate the Gas Guzzler Tax rating for vehicles that were not subject to the tax, but it has
the disadvantage of a coverage gap. Between 1984 and 1998, the EPA data do not include the
unrounded test results necessary for calculating the correct Gas Guzzler Tax rating.
These same EPA data are our source for fuel economy label ratings. We transform the
unrounded city and highway test results according to the EPA's in-use shortfall adjustment
factors in order to obtain the adjusted, unrounded fuel economy label ratings. In our analysis
of CAFE ratings, we use ocial CAFE fuel economy ratings, which dier slightly from the
EPA ratings used in the other sections, from the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA). CAFE data include sales volumes, and we match the CAFE data
set to the IRS Gas Guzzler list in order to measure the sales volumes of taxed vehicles. We use
this source of sales data instead of more conventional sources like Automotive News because
conventional data sources do not divide the sales of a model line among the dierent engine
congurations, so that the unit of observation is not the same across data sources. Our Canadian
data come from program documents available from the Canadian Government.
4 The Behavioral Response to Fuel Economy Notches
4.1 The Gas Guzzler Tax
If automakers respond to notches in the Gas Guzzler Tax by modifying vehicle fuel economy,
then the distribution of fuel economy ratings should feature \extra" observations just on the
tax-preferred side of notches. A natural rst test, then, is to examine the distribution of the
rating decimal points of all taxed vehicles, relative to the tax notches.
Figure 3 is a histogram of the number of models by their one-decimal Gas Guzzler Tax
rating between 1991 and 2009, during which time the Gas Guzzler Tax schedule is stable and
























































































































































Note: IRS data, sample size is 1,221. Ratings ending in .4, all of which are just below a
tax notch, are colored in blue, while ratings ending in .5 are colored in red.
notches are present at each rating ending in .5. Bars at a .4 decimal (the low-tax side of a
notch) are shaded blue, and bars at a .5 rating (the high-tax side of a notch) are shaded red.
Of the ten dierent integer values, the number at .5 exceeds the number at .4 in seven cases,
sometimes by a large margin. Overall, there are 150 models at a .5 decimal and 99 at a .4
decimal. The probability that, of 249 draws, 150 or more would be drawn from a binomial
distribution with equal probability is just 0.0007. If we compare the number of models at .3 or
.4 to the number at .5 or .6, the story does not change: 200 just below the notch versus 295
just above.
The counterexamples to the preponderance of .5 decimals over .4 decimals are high-performance,
high-price ultra-luxury automobiles with very low fuel eciency. Manufacturers of these cars
may perceive that their prospective buyers care little about a few hundred dollars because it
is a small fraction of the total cost, or even perceive that a low MPG is a status symbol of
high performance. These models also have relatively low sales volume, so that if modication
involves a xed cost, we would see less bunching among these vehicles. To capture this possi-




























































































































































Note: IRS fuel economy data and NHTSA sales data; sample size is 841. Ratings ending
in .4, all of which are just below a tax notch, are colored in blue, while ratings ending in
.5 are colored in red. Sample diers from gure 3 because some vehicle types are missing
sales information and sales data are unavailable for 2008 and 2009.
bility, gure 4 replicates gure 3 but weights the distribution by sales volume. In this gure,
the predominance of .5 decimals is even more pronounced, and the integers where .5 do not
predominate feature very low sales.
Figure 5 aggregates across integers to show a histogram of MPG of the decimal values for
all vehicles subject to the Gas Guzzler Tax. For example, if a vehicle had a 20.5 fuel economy
rating, we put that vehicle into the .5 bin. Aggregation allows us to include more data by
combining dierent tax regimes.12
Absent tax incentives, we might expect this decimal distribution to be uniform. The actual
distribution shows a marked departure from uniformity, with far more observations just at, or
just to the right of .5.13 This dierence is highly unlikely to be due to chance. Comparing
12As shown in Table 1, the value of the Gas Guzzler Tax changes at each .5 in fuel economy ratings, except
for 1980, 1981, 1983 and 1985, for which years we adjust the data to match the .5 notch point in the gure.
13Results are qualitatively similar if we restrict the sample to unique observations by dropping all vehicles with
the same manufacturer, cylinders, displacement, transmission and fuel economy rating as some other vehicle,
either within or across years. This restriction is intended to drop repeated observations of the same engine,



















































Note: IRS data; sample size is 1,476. In several years, the notch is at whole integers (the .0
bin). For those years, we shift decimals by .5, so the notch is always represented by the .5 bin.



















































Note: IRS and NHTSA data; sample size is 945.
either the number of vehicle congurations in the .4 bin to the .5 bin, or comparing the sum of
the .3 and .4 bins to the sum of the .5 and .6 bins, yields a p-value less than .0001 that they are
which may be installed on several dierent models.
15drawn from a uniform distribution.14 Figure 6 provides a sales-weighted histogram of ratings
decimals. Here, the gap between sales around the notch are even more pronounced, though the
distribution shows greater variation overall.
The statistical tests cited above are based on the assumption that, in the absence of notch
responses, the preponderance of .4 and .5 decimals would be the same. This assumption may
not be precisely correct if the overall fuel economy distribution has a positive slope, in which
case there might be more .5 decimals for reasons unrelated to the notches. If this were driving
our results, we would expect gures 5 and 6 to show a tilt across all decimals, i.e., there would
be more .1 than .0, more .2 than .1, etc. We do not see this pattern.
To further dispel such concerns, we redid our statistical tests after accounting for the overall
shape of the fuel economy distribution, the results of which we report in table 3. First, we
estimate a polynomial through the frequency distribution in gure 3, omitting observations at
the .4 and .5 decimals. We then use the predicted values from these polynomials to predict the
relative number of .4 and .5 decimals that should occur, given the shape of the distribution.
Combining these estimates yields the predicted probability that a vehicle would have a .5
decimal, conditional on the observation being either .4 or .5, under the null hypothesis that
the polynomial predicts the relative prevalence correctly. We then use this new predicted
probability to ask how likely it is that we would have observed 150 observations at .5 out of 249
that were either .4 or .5. Rather than simply do a single t-test with the adjusted probabilities,
however, we bootstrap this entire procedure (starting by resampling our microdata) so as to
incorporate the variance that arises from the estimation of the polynomial.
Table 3 shows that this adjustment has very little impact on the estimated probabilities. The
rst row of the table shows what we label the binomial model, which is our original assumption
that the counterfactual probabilities of ratings ending in .4 and .5 are equal. We observe 150
out of 249 above the notch. Under the binomial model assumption, the expected number of
observations above the notch is 124.5, and the standard deviation is 7.89. The second row
14This signicance test comes from treating the observations in the restricted distribution just around the
notch as a binomial distribution, with points above the notch treated as a successful trial. We calculate the
p-values reported here using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution.
16Table 3: Statistical Tests of Bunching Above Gas Guzzler Tax Notches
Observed Number
Above Notch










Binomial Model 150 124.5 7.89 0.0007
Linear Control Function 150 125.4 7.89 0.0009
Quintic Control Function 150 124.8 7.97 0.0008
Note: The binomial model assumes that the probabilities that a vehicle has a fuel economy rating ending in
.4 and .5 are the same. The linear model modies this assumption by adjusting for the overall shape of the
distribution using a linear t, excluding observations within .1 MPG of a notch. The quintic model extends
this by using a fth order polynomial to estimate the distribution's shape. Statistics for the linear and quintic
models are derived via bootstrap to account for sampling variation in the estimated polynomial.
of table 3 shows the expectation and standard deviation when only a linear control is used,
and the third row shows a fth-order polynomial. The expected number of observations above
the notch and the standard deviation change only slightly. This is not surprising because the
overall shape of the distribution in gure 3 does not exhibit a dramatic slope. The probability
of observing 150 observations above the notch is extremely unlikely under any of the modeling
alternatives, which bolsters the conclusion that the data reveal strategic responses to notches.15
4.2 Determinants of Bunching
If automakers respond to notches, we would expect to nd more bunching around notches with
greater tax values. And, if there are xed costs in modication, we would expect more bunching
among vehicles with higher sales. We test these additional hypotheses using a linear probability
model, where the dependent variable is coded as 1 if an observation falls on the tax-preferred
side of a notch, in a sample restricted to cars within a window on either side of notches.
Table 4 shows results using a window of .2 MPG around notches, so the sample includes
vehicles whose Gas Guzzler Tax rating ends in either .3, .4, .5 or .6, and the dependent variable
is coded as 1 for the .5 and .6 observations. The rst four columns use data from the IRS. This
15An alternative methodology is to collapse the data and perform statistical tests on the aggregated cell
counts, treating each fuel economy rating as the unit of observation rather than each vehicle. Regressions based
on this approach are included in the appendix. They show a large amount of bunching, which is statistically
signicant when cell counts are sales weighted.
17Table 4: The Correlation Between Bunching and Sales Volume and Tax Notch Value
Dependent variable = 1 if vehicle on tax-preferred side of notch
Sample includes vehicles with ratings ending in .3, .4, .5 and .6
IRS Data (1980-2009) EPA Data (1998-2007)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Log Sales 0.0439*** 0.0435***
(0.0149) (0.0161)
Gas Guzzler Value ($100) 0.00179 -0.000548 0.0136***
(0.00684) (0.00679) (0.00393)
Gas Guzzler Range Dummy 0.126***
(0.0328)
Constant 0.600*** 0.340*** 0.589*** 0.345*** 0.447*** 0.450***
(0.0201) (0.0931) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0113) (0.0111)
Observations 593 371 593 371 2,207 2,207
R2 0.00001 0.023 0.0001 0.023 0.007 0.005
Note: Columns 1 through 4 use IRS data, which include only vehicles that pay the Gas Guzzler Tax. Columns
5 and 6 use EPA data. This enables the inclusion of vehicles that do not pay the Gas Guzzler Tax, including
both vehicles located just above the top notch and those further away who face a zero incentive for moving over
.5. Sales data are not available in the EPA data, so not all specications are repeated with both samples.
allows us to include all years of data, from 1980 to 2009, and to include sales volume, but it
restricts the sample to observations that pay the Gas Guzzler Tax. This means that we cannot
include the top notch, nor can we include vehicles that are not around a tax notch as a baseline.
Columns 5 and 6 use EPA data instead, which allows us to include the top notch and vehicles
not near a notch as a baseline, but it restricts the years of availability and does not allow us to
include sales volume controls due to data limitations.
Column 1 includes only a constant, which is equal to the fraction of observations on the
tax-preferred side of notches. This estimate is statistically dierent from .5, which would be
the counterfactual value under the null hypothesis of no strategic bunching. Column 5 provides
a similar test in the EPA data, but it includes both a constant and a dummy variable coded
as 1 if the vehicle is in the range of the Gas Guzzler Tax because there are also vehicles in
the sample that are not near a notch. The fact that the dummy is positive and statistically
signicant indicates that vehicles facing a Gas Guzzler Tax notch are more likely to have a
decimal of .5 or .6 than vehicles with fuel economy outside the Gas Guzzler Tax range.
Column 2 shows that vehicles with higher sales volumes are signicantly more likely to be
18on the tax-preferred side of a notch. If automakers were not bunching strategically and the
\extra" observations on the tax-preferred side of notches were due to chance, there would be
no reason to expect those observations on the tax-preferred side to be higher volume.16 If,
however, there are xed costs in manipulation, we would expect higher sales volume vehicles to
be more likely to bunch. The strong correlation between sales and bunching therefore provides
additional support for our hypothesis that automakers respond to notches.
The IRS data (column 3) shows a small, statistically insignicant coecient on notch value.
In the EPA data (column 6), however, there is a positive coecient, so there is more bunching
surrounding notches with higher values. The dierence is due to the importance of the top
notch, which has many data points and a large notch value of $1,000. Excluding data from the
top notch in the EPA data produces a coecient similar to the IRS data (not shown).
4.3 False Experiments
One might be concerned that the preponderance of vehicle congurations with ratings at or just
above .5 might be an artifact of some unknown engineering property or other anomaly. We test
this by reproducing the Gas Guzzler Tax fuel economy measure for vehicles not subject to the
tax and seeing if the pattern reemerges here. This requires use of the EPA data, which limits
the sample to 1999-2007. First, we reproduce the main result from gure 5 for this subsample
of years in part (a) of gure 7, which shows evidence of bunching but with considerably greater
noise than the main gure with the unconstrained sample.
Second, we look for bunching behavior around notch values when no tax incentive for bunch-
ing exists. Part (b) shows the distribution of fuel economy decimals for passenger cars that
have ratings above the Gas Guzzler Tax threshold MPG and therefore have no incentive to
bunch at or just above .5 decimals. Likewise, part (c) shows the distribution of rating decimals
for light trucks in the same fuel economy range as the passenger cars in part (a). Because light
16Here we describe sales volume as an exogenous characteristic, but a lower Gas Guzzler Tax for a vehicle
will lead to a lower price and thus increase sales, making sales an endogenous characteristic. This is true, but
an extraordinarily high price elasticity would be required to explain the magnitude of the dierences in sales
volume for high and low tax vehicles observed in the data.
19Figure 7: Gas Guzzler Rating Decimals for Several Vehicle Groups: 1999 - 2007



















































































































































Note: Total sample sizes are (a) 608, (b) 5,422 and (c) 3,236. Vehicles in parts (b) and (c) are not subject to
the tax and not expected to exhibit bunching.
trucks are not subject to the Gas Guzzler Tax, there is no incentive to bunch. The fact that
neither class of vehicles exhibits bunching is further evidence that the bunching in the vehicles
subject to the tax is due to a strategic response to notches.
For an additional false experiment, we examine a closely related fuel economy measure, indi-
vidual vehicle CAFE ratings, which do not have a notch at .5. Each vehicle in a manufacturer's
eet is given a CAFE rating based on a weighted average of the vehicle's city and highway
fuel economies. These combined ratings, which are calculated to the tenth of a MPG (e.g.,
27.5 MPG), are used to calculated a sales-weighted average for all vehicles made by a given
manufacturer. This sales-weighted average is then rounded to a tenth of a mile-per-gallon for

















































Note: NHTSA data; sample size is 18,045.
use in determining compliance with CAFE. Because the individual fuel economy ratings are
not rounded to integers prior to averaging, there is no incentive for manufacturers to push
individual vehicle CAFE ratings above any particular decimal.17 Figure 8 shows the combined
CAFE rating decimal distribution. The ratings are roughly uniform, as expected. There are
slightly more observations in the .5 bin than the .4 bin, but this dierence is not statistically
signicant.18 This is further evidence of our main conclusion.
4.4 Bunching Above the Top Gas Guzzler Notch
Looking only at the fuel economy ratings used in the IRS data does not reveal what is arguably
the most striking example of bunching: increasing fuel economy so that it just above the
threshold for any tax at all. It is not apparent because the IRS does not publish ratings for
vehicles that are not subject to tax, and so their data do not reveal how many models have a
fuel economy rating just over the taxable threshold, which since 1991 has been 22.5 MPG.
17Manipulation of the Gas Guzzler will translate into manipulation of the CAFE rating, because the two
numbers are identical in early years and extremely close to each other in later years. Thus, we omit passenger
cars with combined fuel economy ratings below 23, which would be subject to the Gas Guzzler Tax.
18A test of the dierence between the .4 and .5 bins yields a one-sided p-value of .092, and a test of the
dierence between the .3 and .4 bins from the .5 and .6 bins yields a one-sided p-value of .400. Overall, a
chi-squared test statistic of the null hypothesis that the data are distributed multinomial with equal probability
on each bin cannot be rejected (p-value of .994).
21In order to ascertain the amount of bunching at the top, we reconstruct the Gas Guzzler
Tax rating for all vehicles using EPA data in the available years | 1978 to 1983 and 1998 to
2007. Between 1978 and 1983, the Gas Guzzler Tax was changing. As indicated above in table
1, in 1978 and 1979, there was no tax. The tax began in 1980, at which time it had a top notch
of 15.0. This changed to 17.0 in 1981, and then 18.5 in 1982, and nally 19.0 in 1983. Figure
9 shows the distribution of fuel economy ratings for passenger cars in each of these six years.
In each diagram, the dashed blue vertical lines indicate the location of future top notches. The
unbroken red vertical lines indicate the eective top notch for the year shown.
These six gures suggest a precise response to the top notch. Before the policy, a large
fraction of vehicles lay to the left of the blue lines, so they would be subject to a tax in future
years. When the tax is introduced for cars below 15.0 MPG in 1980, a majority of the vehicles
that were previously below this level are gone. The same adjustments occur in 1981, 1982 and
1983; in each year, most of the vehicles that would have been just below the notch have moved.
The entire distribution shifted rightward, not just vehicles near the notch.19 The overall shift
is likely due to CAFE, which was introduced at the same time, but it appears that the details
of the distribution were driven by the location of the top Gas Guzzler Tax notch.
The EPA data are unavailable during the rest of the tax's phase-in period, but they are
available for several years after the top notch of 22.5 MPG was established in 1991. Figure
10 is a histogram of the number of models of all vehicles produced from 1991 to 2007 by their
CAFE fuel rating, whether they are subject to the Gas Guzzler Tax or not. The dark vertical
line is drawn at the tax threshold of 22.5 MPG. The vast majority of models are above the
Gas Guzzler Tax threshold, and there is a clear asymmetry in the histogram. To quantify
the bunching above the top notch apparent in gure 10, we estimate an 8th-order polynomial
on the distribution of passenger car Gas Guzzler Tax ratings over the available sample period
from 1998 to 2007, omitting data within 1 mpg of the top notch at 22.5. We then take the
predicted number of observations near the Gas Guzzler Tax top notch and compare that to the
19This is evident in gure 9 from the reduction in the fraction of vehicles getting under 22.5 MPG. The entire
distribution is not shown to preserve visibility of the relevant portion, but the heights of the histograms are
preserved to be comparable.
22Figure 9: Gas Guzzler Tax Rating Distribution During Tax Phase In
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Note: Data come from the EPA. Distributions are truncated at 22.5 MPG, but percentages on the horizontal
axis reect the entire distribution, including the portion not shown.
actual number of observations. This regression, which has an R2 of .81, predicts that 57% of
the vehicles within 1 mpg of the top notch will be above the notch { this is more than half




















































































































































Note: Data come from the EPA.
because of the upward slope in the distribution in this neighborhood. In the actual data, 82%
of the observations in this window are above the notch. This implies that over two-thirds of the
vehicles within 1 mpg of the top notch moved in response to policy, which is equivalent to 3.4%
of the vehicles in the entire car market (of whom only a modest fraction are near the notch).
There is nothing special about 22.5 MPG in terms of technology that could explain the
apparent discontinuity in the distribution. To be convinced of that, consider gure 11, which is
a scatter plot, separately for 1978 and 2004, of models by horsepower and fuel economy rating,
where the size of the circles indicate the sales volume of each observation.20 In each year,
there is a negative relationship between the two attributes: other things equal, fuel economy
suers as a vehicle's power increases. The outward shift between 1978 and 2004 indicates
technological progress in the intervening years | fuel economy for a given horsepower has
increased markedly.21 For our purposes, what is of interest is the bunching of observations just
20Fuel economy data in this plot are taken from CAFE data, where the fuel economy rating is very similar,
but not identical, to the Gas Guzzler Tax rating. CAFE and Gas Guzzler Tax ratings dier by around .1 or .2
MPG, so the CAFE rating can be used to show a broad picture but not precise decimal analysis.
21See Knittel (2009) for an analysis of this technological shift.
24Figure 11: Horsepower and Fuel Economy in 1978 and 2004: Passenger Cars
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Source: Authors' calculations of NHTSA data.
to the right at the Gas Guzzler Tax threshold of 22.5 MPG, shown by the vertical line. No
such bunching is observed in the 1978 data, before the enactment of the Gas Guzzler Tax.
Figure 12, adapted from gure 8 in Sallee (2010), plots the market share of vehicles near the
22.5 MPG threshold since 1978, separately for taxable cars, tax-exempt trucks, and all vehicles.
The car series has a precipitous drop-o in that fuel economy class just as the Gas Guzzler Tax
began to aect cars with MPG as high as 20, in 1985. In contrast, the market share of trucks
in that MPG class jumped sharply at the same time. Sallee (2010) interprets this as evidence
that automakers responded to the tax by designing vehicles in that part of the fuel economy
distribution to qualify as light-trucks, thereby avoiding the tax and relaxing CAFE constraints.
One reason for the especially large bunching at the top tax threshold is that the tax saving
at that notch is signicantly larger than for most other notches. Moving over the top notch
saves $1,000 (since 1991), whereas other notches are as low as $300. We propose, though, that
it may also be that car manufacturers placed a value on avoiding the stigma of a vehicle being
25Figure 12: Market Share of Vehicles Rated Between 20 and 22.5 MPG: Passenger Cars, Light
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Source: Authors' calculations of NHTSA data.
ocially labeled a gas guzzler, regardless of the tax liability that came with that designation.
4.5 Evidence from Canada's Feebate
The Canadian feebate provides an opportunity to study automaker response to the introduction
of unexpected notches, which requires reaction on a short time horizon. The program was
announced in March 2007, at which point all model year 2007 vehicles had been designed and
rated and were in the middle of their production cycle. The program appears to have been a
surprise to automakers and, even if they had anticipated some policy, it is unlikely that they
knew the details suciently well to alter fuel economy strategically for 2007 models.22
Between March 2007 and the fall of 2007, when most 2008 vehicles began production and
received fuel economy ratings, automakers had an opportunity to re-engineer their 2008 model
22In 2005, a similar program was discussed but not enacted. Prior to the 2007 budget announcement, there
was anticipation that an energy-eciency subsidy, perhaps including cars, would be included (National Post
2007). But there is no indication automakers were involved in crafting the bill, and they claimed to have been
\blindsided" by the policy Keenan (2007b).
26Figure 13: Distribution of 2007-8 Fuel Economy Changes Minus the 2007 Distance to a Notch
(a) Vehicles within .3 L/100km in 2007
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(b) Vehicles within .3 L/100km in 2007
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Note: Total sample sizes are (a) 71 and (b) 56. Raw count shown above each bar.
year vehicles in response to the policy. We expect to see the 2008 version of many models move
to the tax-preferred or rebate-preferred side of a notch relative to their 2007 position. To test
for this, we matched the ocial Canadian fuel economy records for 2007 to the corresponding
2008 observation. We declared a vehicle matched if its model name, body type, fuel type,
cylinders, displacement and transmission (automatic versus manual) matched across years. We
matched 812 models out of 1,040 vehicles from 2007. Many non-matches were due to changes
in engine displacement, so our analysis will be biased against nding a response if automakers
changed displacement in response to the policy.
In our matched sample of 812 vehicles, 146 models had a non-zero feebate in 2007 { 17
received a rebate and 129 were taxed. Between 2007 and 2008, 766 saw no change in tax or
subsidy status. Of the 46 vehicles that changed status, only 5 moved to a less favorable notch,
while 41 moved to a more favorable notch. Although this pattern is suggestive of strategic
response, secular trends in fuel economy ratings could in principle produce similar changes.
Figures 13a and 13b provide graphical analysis. These gures are histograms of the distri-
bution of the change in fuel economy between 2007 and 2008, relative to the distance to the
nearest notch in 2007. The sample is restricted to models that in 2007 were close to a notch,
27Table 5: Regression Test of Response to Canadian Feebate Notches
Vehicle Improved Vehicle Improved Vehicle Improved
.1 L/100km or More .2 L/100km or More .3 L/100km or More
Vehicle within .1 0.0372
L/100km of Notch (0.0896)
Vehicle within .2 0.146**
L/100km of Notch (0.0586)
Vehicle within .3 0.147***
L/100km of Notch (0.0438)
Constant 0.296*** 0.194*** 0.135***
(0.0164) (0.0146) (0.0130)
Observations 807 807 807
R2 0.0002 0.0076 0.0138
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are dummy variables indicating whether or not
a vehicle improved its fuel economy by .X L/100km between 2007 and 2008. The right hand side variables are
dummy variables indicating whether or not a vehicle was within .X L/100km in 2007.
where \close" is dened as being within .3 L/100k of a more favorable bracket. A value of 0
means that the 2007-8 fuel economy improvement was just enough to make it to the next lower
tax or higher rebate in 2008; a -0.1 value means that the fuel economy change fell just short
of improving tax treatment. If fuel economy changes did not respond to the feebate notches,
we would not expect the density to be particularly high or low near zero, nor would we expect
the distribution to be asymmetric. Figure 13a suggests that the opposite is true: there are dis-
tinctly more vehicle models just over the next notch than just short of it. Figure 13b replicates
this but drops vehicles whose fuel economy stayed exactly the same. Here the asymmetry is
much more striking; of those vehicles close to a notch in 2007 that were re-engineered in some
way, almost none ended up just short of the notch, while while many ended up just on the tax
or rebate-favorable side. Of those whose fuel economy changed, 26 models ended up within .2
L/100km over the notch, while only 3 ended up within .2 L/100km under the notch.
Regression results in table 5 tell a similar story. Each column shows a linear probability
model where the dependent variable is whether the change in fuel economy between 2007 and
2008 exceeded a certain threshold, and the lone independent variable (other than a constant) is
a dummy variable indicating whether in 2007 the vehicle was within the same value of the next
favorable notch. If fuel economy changes are unrelated to notch incentives, a vehicle's proximity
28to a 2007 fuel economy notch should not aect the probability it improves by a specic amount.
The results suggest otherwise. For the second and third column, when the thresholds are .2 and
.3 L/100km respectively, being within a given distance to the next notch greatly increases the
probability that at least that amount of fuel economy improvement occurs. The third column
corresponds to the case shown in gure 13, but eectively compares the response of vehicles
within .3 L/100km of a notch in 2007 to all other vehicles, and conrms that the distribution
of fuel economy improvement is not typical of vehicles not similarly situated near a notch.
5 Welfare Analysis
Having established that automakers manipulate fuel economy in response to notches, we now
develop a framework to assess the welfare implications of this behavior. We remain agnostic
as to the potential administrative simplicity or salience benets of notches, and focus here on
documenting the costs that must be outweighed by such benets in order to justify the use
of notched policies. Our framework is built on several assumptions. First, we assume that
the policy is motivated by a desire to correct an externality associated with fuel economy and
that policy-makers created a notched schedule rather than a smooth one out of administrative
simplicity, not because they were targeting the most responsive automakers in the spirit of
Blinder and Rosen (1985).23 We suspect that this is the origin of most policy notches | they
are coarse approximations of a smooth schedule rather than strategic decisions.
Second, we assume that automobile design occurs in two stages. In the rst stage, which
begins many months before production, automakers make global decisions about engine size,
body style and vehicle features that have large impacts on fuel economy. At this stage, au-
tomakers know a vehicle's fuel economy approximately, but they are uncertain of the exact
value and therefore do not know their location vis- a-vis notches. In the second stage, which
may be only a few months before production, automakers observe their exact fuel economy by
23In reality, fuel economy has social cost implications related to both miles driven, from congestion and
accident externalities, as well as gasoline consumed, from air pollution, climate change and energy security
externalities. Given our interest in creating a general framework for the welfare analysis of notches, we abstract
from these specic concerns and simply assume there is a negative externality associated with lower fuel economy.
29testing prototype vehicles and learn their proximity to any notch. During this second stage,
automakers decide whether or not to tweak vehicles in response to the notch locations, and
we assume this tweaking is limited to less than one full MPG. Moreover, automakers have a
limited set of possible modications, all of which create a discrete fuel economy change. (That
these tweaks are discrete is our explanation for why we observe bunching at .6 in addition to
.5.) An automaker considering moving over a notch will determine if the cheapest available
modication is worth doing. Based on our conversations with engineers, we believe this is a
realistic representation of the process.
Third, we adopt a stylized model of both the supply and demand side of the market. On
the supply side, we assume that, with respect to individual attributes, automakers behave
competitively when determining vehicle design. That is, in the absence of policy, automakers
will increase the fuel economy of a given model as long as the cost of doing so is below the
consumer willingness to pay, so that if there were no externality, then the provision of fuel
economy in the absence of policy would be ecient. We assume that all privately benecial
fuel economy modications are made in the rst stage of vehicle design. This means that policy
alone drives second-stage modications.
On the demand side, we assume that consumers purchase only one vehicle, which avoids the
attribute reshuing described in Kleven and Slemrod (2009), which we believe is peripheral to
our analysis here. Consumers value vehicles based on their underlying attributes, one of which
is fuel economy. Because of xed per-variety costs, a nite number of varieties { assumed to be
xed { is produced, and each consumer chooses which variety of car is best, which generates a
set of vehicles and a distribution of fuel economy values. Each type of vehicle is optimal for one
class of consumers, and given an initial equilibrium, small changes in taxes will induce small
changes in vehicle fuel economy, but will not cause consumers to switch vehicles. Thus, the
quantity of each vehicle sold does not respond to the fuel economy changes induced by taxes.
Given these assumptions, we can model the introduction of a smooth subsidy to increase
fuel economy in the market. The social gain from this subsidy SG is approximately equal to
(1=2)eX, where e denotes the dierence between the marginal social cost and the marginal
30private cost of MPG which, in the absence of other policies, would equal the externality. The
expression X stands for the change in the externality-causing activity, measured in units of
vehicle-MPGs.24 X should be thought of as an industry-wide measure, which averages over
the discrete changes made by individual vehicles. Noting that X  st, where s captures
both demand and supply elasticities, then it is straightforward to show that the value of SG is
maximized where t = e. This is the rst-best outcome with a Pigouvian tax.25




(2e   t)X; (1)
which is always less than the case where t = e, when (1) reduces to the previous expression.
When t 6= e, some potential welfare gain is foregone either by failing to induce some socially
valuable MPG increase (when t < e) or by inducing MPG increases whose marginal social cost
exceeds the marginal social benet (when t > e). This is illustrated in Figure 14, where the
left panel shows the welfare gain from a too-small subsidy, and the right-hand diagram shows
the initial gain, then subsequent loss from setting the subsidy at too high a rate.
Under a smooth subsidy, all automakers face the same incentive t for each vehicle. Under a
notched policy, however, in the second stage some vehicles are close to a notch and others are
far. As automakers consider the merits of their least expensive second-stage tweaks, they will
face radically dierent eective subsidies per MPG, depending on the proximity of a notch.
To make this concrete, consider the Gas Guzzler Tax, which imposes an average tax of
$800 per MPG, which equates to an $80 subsidy for every increase of a tenth of an MPG.
Suppose that this is the marginal social benet of increased fuel economy (e = $800), so that a
Pigouvian tax would levy an $80 subsidy per tenth of an MPG. A notched subsidy that jumps
by $800 at a notch every MPG creates an eective per-MPG subsidy that varies depending
24E.g., if automakers increase the MPG of one million cars by 0.1 and another 100,000 cars by 0.2, X would
be 120,000.
25We ignore the social benet from raising revenue by invoking the argument of Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994) and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997) that a small environmental tax generates the same labor-market
distortion as the labor tax it presumably replaces, and the gross distortion to consumption patterns is small if
the tax system is second-best optimal.













Note: The blue shaded area in the gure on the left is the welfare gain from a subsidy below
the Pigouvian optimum. The gure on the right shows a subsidy in excess of the Pigouvian
tax, with the blue area representing a social gain and the red area a social loss. Diagrams
represent the entire market of vehicles facing a particular subsidy, and smooth MC - MB
curves come from averaging discrete second-stage modication choice across many vehicles.
on the vehicle's decimal after the rst stage of design and the size of the jump induced by the
second-stage tweak. Table 6 quanties this variation, where the rows correspond to the initial,
\unmanipulated" MPG decimal points, and the columns correspond to ending MPG decimals.
Each cell contains the eective per-MPG subsidy from moving from a given starting decimal
to a given ending decimal, assuming the jump length is at most 0.9. The magnitude of a jump
is measured by the horizontal dierence to the right of a diagonal entry marked with an X,
including \wrap-arounds" { cases where the ending decimal is below the starting decimal but
the integer (not shown) has changed.
The intended subsidy is $800 per-MPG, but table 6 shows that the actual per-MPG subsidy
varies from $0 (for tweaks that do not cross a notch) to $8,000 per-MPG (for vehicles starting
at a .4 rating with .1 MPG tweaks). The notched system creates several subsidies, some too
small and some too big. Although the subsidy is by assumption appropriate on average, the
welfare eects deviate from the smooth policy because a set of incorrect taxes that happen to
average out to the correct amount do not yield the same welfare gains as a uniformly applied
correct tax. It is socially desirable for re-engineering to occur whenever the private cost is
32Table 6: Eective Average Subsidy per MPG, Depending on Starting and Ending MPG
Decimal
Starting Decimal Ending Decimal
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 X 0 0 0 0 1600 1333 1143 1000 889
0.1 889 X 0 0 0 2000 1600 1333 1143 1000
0.2 1000 889 X 0 0 2667 2000 1600 1333 1143
0.3 1143 1000 889 X 0 4000 2667 2000 1600 1333
0.4 1333 1143 1000 889 X 8000 4000 2667 2000 1600
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 889 X 0 0 0
0.7 0 0 0 0 0 1000 889 X 0 0
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 1143 1000 889 X 0
0.9 0 0 0 0 0 1333 1143 1000 889 X
Note: Table shows eective subsidy per MPG of a vehicle that starts at the fuel economy
decimal in each row value and ends, after manipulation, in the column value. Table assumes
a notch value of $800 (the Gas Guzzler Tax average) and includes \wrap-around" values, but
assumes all jumps are less than 1 MPG.
less than $800 per-MPG, and to not occur when the cost exceeds $800 MPG. A notch system
does not achieve this. For the half of cells with zeros, no reengineering will take place even if
the private cost is less than $800 per-MPG. For the half of cells with a positive number, some
re-engineering will occur even when its cost exceeds $800; indeed, for vehicles at .4 and jumps
of just 0.1 MPG, reengineering will take place as long as the cost is $7999 per MPG or less!
We can use equation 1, which characterizes the welfare gain from an inaccurately sized
subsidy, to characterize the social gain of a notched policy by writing the latter as the sum of






















where ti refers to the ith average eective tax, Xi refers to the change in vehicle miles-per-
gallon of those subject to it (X 
P




X is the Xi-weighted average
eective tax rate. In terms of Figure 14, this is the summation of a number of these welfare
triangles. Note that there is a positive correlation between ti and Xi (the bigger the tax,
the larger the response), which will tend to reduce the value of the net social gain because, for
example, the vehicles most likely to have their fuel economy changed are those for which the
33Table 7: Hypothetical Distribution for Welfare Calculation
Bins Average Fuel Economy Actual Distribution Counterfactual Distribution
.0 0.05 0.1 0.1
.1 0.15 0.1 0.1
.2 0.25 0.1 0.1
.3 0.35 0.09 0.1
.4 0.45 0.07 0.1
.5 0.55 0.14 0.1
.6 0.65 0.1 0.1
.7 0.75 0.1 0.1
.8 0.85 0.1 0.1
.9 0.95 0.1 0.1
Note: Table shows hypothetical values only.
eective local subsidy per-MPG is ten times higher than the \intended" rate of subsidy. This
social gain formula indicates the net social gain of the manipulation that occurs in the second
stage of vehicle design.
This formula allows us to use ex post data | that is, data on the distribution of vehicles'
MPGs after manipulation | and a counterfactual distribution to approximate the welfare
consequences of notched local incentives. To build intuition, consider the hypothetical ex post
distribution shown in table 7. In the absence of manipulation, we expect a uniform decimal
distribution, but we observed bunching at .5. Relative to the uniform counterfactual, the data
imply that 30% of the vehicles with a starting .4 decimal and 10% of the vehicles with a













(0:005X) =  12N; (4)
where , the weighted-average eective tax rate, is equal to $6,400 per-MPG, and N is the
total number of vehicles (not vehicle models) in the range of the notch incentives. This says
that the net social benet of second-stage manipulation is negative. Intuitively, this is because
the average (weighted by response) eective subsidy of $6,400 is much larger than the $800
34Table 8: Actual Distribution for Welfare Calculation: Gas Guzzler Tax
Bins Average FE Actual Dist. Counterfactual
.0 0.05 0.1023 0.1
.1 0.15 0.0921 0.1
.2 0.25 0.0989 0.1
.3 0.35 0.0867 0.1
.4 0.45 0.0738 0.1
.5 0.55 0.1260 0.1
.6 0.65 0.1152 0.1
.7 0.75 0.1206 0.1
.8 0.85 0.0840 0.1
.9 0.95 0.1003 0.1
Note: Sample matches gure 5. IRS data; sample size is 1,476.
externality. Most of the vehicle redesign happens for vehicles whose cost exceeds the social
benet of increased fuel economy.
Analyzing the actual distribution of rating decimals for vehicles subject to the Gas Guzzler
Tax, shown in table 8, requires the same steps. Because our data show almost exactly 30% of
observations fall between .0 and .2 and almost exactly 30% fall between .7 and .9, we assume
that all second-stage manipulation took place among vehicles starting at .3 or .4 and moving





(:0063N) =  $10:50N: In
the hypothetical example, all of the bunching occurs at .5, so we did not need to make any
assumption about which observations started and ended where. In the actual data, there is
bunching at .5 and .6, so we must make an assumption about this mapping in order to utilize
all the values in the social gain formula. Importantly, our linear approximation of the social
gain is invariant to the mapping between the ex ante distribution and the ex post distribution,
so long as the counterfactual distribution is correct and second-stage manipulation occurred
only in response to the notches and only in sizes smaller than 1 full MPG, as assumed above.
This is important because it implies that this welfare statistic can be calculated for any ex post
data set that reveals bunching, provided a counterfactual is available. Researchers do not need
to know which observations started where in order to approximate this social gain statistic.
The local incentives of the notch generates a social loss of $10.50 per car from second-stage
26We make a very small adjustment to the ex post value at .6 in order to make this assumption hold exactly.
35manipulation. The actual ex post weighted-average subsidy () of $4,766 per-MPG is lower
than the $8,000 per-MPG that what would obtain if all manipulation were of length 0.1, but
is more than the $4,000 per-MPG if all the jumps were of length 0.2. As long as this weighted
average subsidy is greater than two times the externality, the net impact of the second-stage
manipulation will be negative.27
Equation 2 calculates the net social gain of all second-stage manipulation, some of which is
ecient. Another interesting benchmark is to compare this social gain to the social gain from a
smooth subsidy, which would induce all of the ecient modications and none of the inecient
ones. This requires decomposing our social gain formula into the ecient (the blue triangle in
gure 14) and the inecient (red triangle in gure 14) portions. Elementary geometry provides
























where the rst term is the gain from ecient manipulation and the second term is the loss from
inecient manipulation. Just as with equation 2, each term can be summed across the various
t to create a single statistic but, unlike the other measure, the decomposed summations are not
invariant to the mapping between starting and ending decimal values.
In our case, the lack of invariance is easily solved through reasonable auxiliary assumptions.
If we assume that vehicles only move either .1 or .2 MPG in response to the notch (which seems
reasonable given that there is no shortage of observations at .2), then it must be that all of
the vehicles that started at .3 ended at .5. This pins down the distribution of ending decimals
for those starting at .4, and we can decompose our social gain into the ecient and inecient
portions, which reveals that the ecient gain is only $.48N, but the inecient loss is -$10.98N.
This decomposition puts -$10.50N into perspective. The net social loss from the second-
stage manipulation in response to the notched subsidies is not only negative, but it is also
27Also, because there will be a positive correlation between eective subsidy rates and manipulation,  will
exceed the average statutory t, which implies that t, the policy parameter, should be set below the Pigouvian
tax that would prevail in a system without notches.
36twenty times as large as the benet from the aected vehicles. Because deadweight loss rises
with the square of t and gains are zero when t = 2e, it is intuitive that eective subsidies of
$8,000 and $4,000, which are 10 and 5 times the externality, yield very large ineciency losses
relative to gains. The ineciency of the notched subsidy compared to the smooth subsidy is
even worse if one considers the vehicles that face a zero subsidy under the notch, for which
socially ecient improvements are not made. The decomposed social gain from the vehicles
starting at the .4 decimal in the data is $0.27N.28 If all vehicles faced the smooth incentive,
then the total benet of second-stage manipulation would be ten times this amount, or $2.70N.
Thus, while the smooth subsidy would generate a $2.70 social benet per unit sold for second-
stage manipulations, the notched subsidy creates a $10.50 social loss per unit. If notches exist
for administrative or salience reasons, these benets must be large enough to oset costs of this
magnitude.
6 Bunching in Fuel Economy Label Ratings
Automakers face fuel economy policy notches not only in the form of tax incentives, but also
in the form of fuel economy labels for consumers. Automakers are required by federal law
to attach a fuel economy label to all new vehicles, and the contents of this label are strictly
prescribed. Ratings must be based on the aforementioned fuel economy test (but are not equal
to the Gas Guzzler Tax rating), and the values must be reported as integers, where the test
results are rounded o. This results in a presentation notch at every .5 MPG, the rounding
cuto. If consumers value fuel economy and use the rounded integers when shopping, then
automakers have an incentive to manipulate fuel economy ratings around these presentation
notches. Whereas only high-performance passenger cars are subject to the Gas Guzzler Tax,
all vehicles have labels, which allows us to test for bunching throughout the entire market.
To test for bunching, we generate histograms similar to the ones presented above for the
Gas Guzzler Tax. Because the EPA's publicly available data les do not include the unrounded
28This follows from using equation 5 on vehicles estimated to have begun at .4 and moved to .5 and .6:
(1=2)8002=4000(:02):0135 + (1=2)8002=8000(:01):0127 = :27:






































































































































































































































Note: Data come from the EPA. Sample excludes vehicles that run on alternative fuels and observations where
the manufacturer, cylinders, displacement, drive type, fuel type, transmission and fuel economy ratings are
identical within a model year.
estimates from 1984 to 1997, we are limited to data from years before and after this period.
Figures 15 and 16 show, respectively, histograms of highway and city fuel economy label ratings
decimals for all vehicles.29 The cuto for rounding to the nearest integer is .5, so we expect to
see bunching at .5 (where the rating is rounded up) relative to .4 (where the rating is rounded
down). Ratings ending in .4 are colored in blue, and those ending in .5 are colored in red.
Figure 15 shows that there are more observations just above notches than just below in
highway ratings, but there are several integer values where the reverse is true. Figure 16,
though, shows consistent and large bunching above notches in city label ratings. Figures 17
and 18 repeat this exercise for the \Big Three" domestic automakers { Chrysler, Ford and
General Motors. Bunching just over presentation notches is amplied in this subsample.
29The tabulations in these, and all subsequent gures in this section, exclude a very small number of vehicles
with unusual fuel types (e.g., compressed natural gas) that are subject to a dierent rating procedure, and
they drop any observation that appears to be a repeat in the sample such that the manufacturer, cylinders,
displacement, drive type, fuel type, transmission and fuel economy ratings are identical within a model year,
with the intention of restricting identical engines that are included in multiple models.
































































































































































































































































Note: Data come from the EPA. Sample excludes vehicles that run on alternative fuels and observations where
the manufacturer, cylinders, displacement, drive type, fuel type, transmission and fuel economy ratings are
identical within a model year.
Table 9 shows statistical signicance tests for this bunching, repeating the analysis used in
table 3 for analysis of the Gas Guzzler Tax. All of the dierences are statistically signicant at
any conventional level, and adjustments for the overall shape of the fuel economy distribution
make very little dierence in the signicance tests.30
Figures 19 and 20 show the decimal distributions aggregated across integers, for the full
sample and just the Big Three in the late and early year samples separately. These gures
show dramatic bunching in the city ratings in both time periods, and there is some evidence
of bunching in the highway rating in recent years. Where there is bunching in the overall
distribution, it is always greater when the sample is restricted to the Big Three.
There are several reasons why domestic automakers may be more responsive to presentation
notches. First, domestic automakers sell a much larger fraction of their vehicles to the U.S.
market. Foreign producers may be reluctant to ne-tune vehicles if only a modest fraction will
30The appendix includes similar regressions based on statistical tests based on aggregated data { where the
fuel economy rating is the unit of observation instead of the vehicle { which conrm the ndings here.







































































































































































































































Note: Data come from the EPA. Sample excludes vehicles that run on alternative fuels and observations where
the manufacturer, cylinders, displacement, drive type, fuel type, transmission and fuel economy ratings are
identical within a model year.
be shipped to the U.S. Second, domestic automakers often face a binding CAFE constraint,
which they meet through various strategic adjustments, including fuel economy tweaking. In
contrast, European automakers are often out of compliance and pay nes rather than adjust
their eet, and Asian automakers are generally well above the minimum (Anderson and Sallee
forthcoming). As a result, the domestic automakers may have developed greater expertise in
nely tuning fuel economy to meet CAFE standards. For example, until very recently, only
domestic rms made use of a CAFE loophole for exible-fuel vehicles (Anderson and Sallee
forthcoming). Third, relative to American consumers of European cars, American consumers of
domestic cars may be more concerned with fuel economy and, relative to the Asian automakers,
domestic rms may be more concerned with boosting their fuel economy image.
Finally, gure 21 separates the sample into passenger cars and light trucks, restricting the
data to the Big Three. This gure suggests that the city rating shows more bunching for light
trucks than cars, whereas the highway rating shows more bunching for cars than trucks. This

































































































































































































































































Note: Data come from the EPA. Sample excludes vehicles that run on alternative fuels and observations where
the manufacturer, cylinders, displacement, drive type, fuel type, transmission and fuel economy ratings are
identical within a model year.
could be due to the dierent uses of trucks and cars on average | truck consumers may be
more concerned about city fuel economy ratings that reect the typical usage patterns of larger
vehicles, whereas car buyers are more concerned about highway driving and commuting.
7 Inferring Consumer Valuation from Bunching
An important policy question in energy economics is whether or not consumers properly value
fuel eciency in durable goods. If consumers do not properly value fuel economy, then standard
results about the superiority of energy taxes to regulatory standards may not hold. This has
pivotal implications for energy and climate change policy, as consumer undervaluation may be
a justication for CAFE or feebates in addition to a fuel or carbon tax.31
31Economists generally argue that fuel economy regulation is inferior to a fuel tax because regulation lowers
the cost of driving a mile (by raising fuel economy but holding fuel prices constant). If consumers do not properly
value fuel economy, however, then they may not respond optimally to changes in fuel prices. If consumer bias
is suciently large, regulation could be preferred to fuel taxation (Fischer, Harrington and Parry 2007).












Highway Ratings (Figure 15)
Binomial Model 791 (1424) 712 18.87 0.00003
Linear Control Function 791 (1424) 709.6 18.64 0.00001
Quintic Control Function 791 (1424) 710.2 18.70 0.00002
City Ratings (Figure 16)
Binomial Model 742 (1382) 691 18.59 0.00607
Linear Control Function 742 (1382) 690.5 19.20 0.00731
Quintic Control Function 742 (1382) 689.8 19.16 0.00644
Highway Ratings, Big Three (Figure 17)
Binomial Model 290 (492) 246 11.09 0.00007
Linear Control Function 290 (492) 245.6 11.02 0.00006
Quintic Control Function 290 (492) 245 11.00 0.00004
City Ratings, Big Three (Figure 18)
Binomial Model 296 (464) 232 10.77 <0.00001
Linear Control Function 296 (464) 232.24 10.17 <0.00001
Quintic Control Function 296 (464) 231.8 10.18 <0.00001
Note: The binomial model assumes that the probabilities that a vehicle has a fuel economy rating ending in
.4 and .5 are the same. The linear model modies this assumption by adjusting for the overall shape of the
distribution using a linear t, excluding observations within .1 MPG of a notch. The quintic model extends
this by using a fth order polynomial to estimate the distribution's shape. Statistics for the linear and quintic
models are derived via bootstrapping to account for sampling variation in the estimated polynomial.
There are several reasons to suspect that consumers might undervalue fuel economy. First,
experimental evidence suggests that consumers do not understand the nonlinearity in fuel sav-
ings from changes in MPG and systematically make mistakes about the relative value of dierent
fuel economy improvements (Larrick and Soll 2008). Second, survey evidence indicates that
consumers are unable to articulate the key building blocks for a fuel economy valuation cal-
culation, including mileage, fuel economy ratings and a discount rate (Turrentine and Kurani
2007). Third, the literature on energy-intensive durables has often found evidence of a very
large implicit discount rate, which may be a symptom of consumer myopia (Hausman 1979;
Dubin and McFadden 1984).32 Finally, in the car market, researchers have tested whether or
not relative prices of ecient and inecient vehicles adjust as much as the standard models
32In contrast, Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995) conclude that discount rates are in line with market interest rates.





































































































































































































Note: Data come from the EPA. Sample excludes vehicles that run on alternative fuels and observations where
the manufacturer, cylinders, displacement, drive type, fuel type, transmission and fuel economy ratings are
identical within a model year.
suggest when gasoline prices change. Much of this literature has found that consumers signif-
icantly undervalue fuel economy (Kahn 1986; Kilian and Sims 2006; Alcott and Wozny 2009),
but some recent work has suggested that consumer valuation may be complete (Busse, Knittel
and Zettelmeyer 2009; Sallee, West and Fan 2009). Greene (2010) and Helfand and Wolverton
(2009) review this literature and conclude that the evidence is mixed and more research is
warranted.
We can combine our analysis of the behavioral response to Gas Guzzler Tax notches with our
analysis of the response to label notches to generate an estimate of the consumer valuation of





































































































































































































Note: Data come from the EPA. Sample excludes vehicles that run on alternative fuels and observations where
the manufacturer, cylinders, displacement, drive type, fuel type, transmission and fuel economy ratings are
identical within a model year.
fuel economy. In the case of the Gas Guzzler Tax, we know the dollar value of crossing a notch,
because it is set by policy. In contrast, the value of fuel economy to consumers is unknown, so
we cannot directly assign a value to fuel economy label notches. But, by comparing the amount
of shifting across the two sets of notches, we can infer the consumer valuation of an increase in
fuel economy. To see this suppose, for example, that all Gas Guzzler Tax notches were worth
$800, and we observed the same amount of bunching around Gas Guzzler Tax notches as we
observed around fuel economy label notches. If the cost of manipulation were the same in both
cases, then this would imply that a fuel economy notch was also perceived to be worth $800. If
44Figure 21: Label Rating Decimals: 1978-1983 and 1998-2007




































































































































































































Note: Data come from the EPA. Sample excludes vehicles that run on alternative fuels and observations where
the manufacturer, cylinders, displacement, drive type, fuel type, transmission and fuel economy ratings are
identical within a model year.
we observed less bunching around the label notches, we would conclude that label notches are
worth less than $800, and so on.
The value to the manufacturer and to consumers of crossing a tax notch depends on the
ultimate incidence of the tax change. But, as long as the incidence of a tax reduction is the same
as the incidence of an incremental attribute improvement, our approach is valid irrespective
of incidence. That is, if automakers capture the same proportion of an increased consumer
willingness to pay from an exogenous tax reduction as they capture of an exogenous increase
in fuel economy, then the notch comparison will shed light on the valuation of fuel economy.
45As in section 5, we assume that vehicles are designed in two stages and take the rst-
stage vehicle design, during which automakers ignore the location of notches, as given. At the
conclusion of the rst stage, automakers observe that a vehicle's MPG is a distance du from
the closest tax-preferred notch and decide whether or not to modify the vehicle in response.
We simplify the discussion by assuming that vehicles are located near only one notch.
In the second stage, manufacturers make marginal design decisions about each vehicle i and
decide to increase fuel economy if the cost of doing so, denoted H(dui;Ni) + "i where N is a
vector of vehicle characteristics and " is a random cost component, is less than the benet of
crossing the notch, denoted V . Considering a set of vehicles that have the same du, the fraction
of these vehicles that will move over a notch is equal to the probability that V > H(dui;Ni)+"i.
Then, a regression of the amount of bunching on the notch value, holding distance and other
characteristics constant, reveals the shape of the distribution of the cost function.
We use this insight to estimate the value of fuel economy label notches using the Gas Guzzler
Tax regressions from section 4.2 above. To do this, we need to compare the amount of bunching
in the Gas Guzzler Tax that occurs within .2 MPG of a notch to the amount of bunching that
takes place within a comparable distance of the fuel economy notches. Although all three
ratings are based on the same tests, the test results undergo a dierent transformation for each
rating. As a result, a fuel economy improvement of .2 MPG in the Gas Guzzler Tax rating does
not necessarily correspond to a change of .2 MPG in the label ratings.
The underlying test statistics for the highway and city tests are transformed via a linear
adjustment, as discussed above in section 2, so that HL = :78H(u) and CL = :9C(u), where
HL and CL represent the nal label ratings, u represents a measure of underlying fuel economy,
and H(u) and C(u) are the raw test scores. The fuel economy rating for the Gas Guzzler Tax







To determine how a change in u will inuence all three measures, we need additional as-
46sumptions. We normalize H(u) = u so that H
0 = 1, which is the derivative of H with respect
to u. To relate H
0 to C
0 we further assume that C
0 is a constant, so that C
0 = H
0. That is, an
engineering change that improves the highway test score by 1 MPG will improve the city test
score by  MPG. Some estimate of  is required to make our calculations. First, we assume that
 = 1, so that the fuel eciency label ratings are aected the same amount by any modica-
tion. Second, we assume that  = :81, which is the slope coecient in a cross-vehicle regression
of the city rating C(u) on the highway rating H(u) and a constant. This regression yields a
prediction equation relating the two measures: ^ C(u) =  6:34 + :81H(u) with an R2 = :91.
To compare the amount of bunching across dierent notch types for a given , we calculate
the change in u implied by a .2 MPG increase in the Gas Guzzler Tax rating, and then calculate
the change in label rating that corresponds to the same u.33 The results, reported in table 10,
are .187 when  = 1 and .220 when  = :81. These values represent the change in u necessary
to move the Gas Guzzler Tax rating by .2 MPG. A change in u of .187 (.220) corresponds
to a change in the highway label rating of .146 (.172) due to the in-use shortfall adjustment.
The same change in u corresponds to a change in the city label rating of .169 (.160). We then
recalculate the amount of bunching in the highway and city label ratings using these values
as the width of our bunching window, so that the bunching window for the Gas Guzzler Tax
rating, the highway label rating and the city label rating now all represent the same change in
u. These bunching estimates are reported for passenger cars in table 10.
To complete the valuation, we calculate the notch value (in 2008 dollars) that would have
generated a bunching prediction equal to the observed value using the results from column
6 of table 4, which characterizes the relationship between notch values and bunching. Table
10 shows substantial estimates, ranging between $402 and $752. These values can be directly
compared to the present discounted value of an increase of one MPG of fuel economy, given
33Because the change in u required to achieve a .2 MPG increase in the Gas Guzzler Tax rating depends on
the distance between the highway and the city test ratings, there is no single change in u that creates a .2 MPG
increase. We calculate the highway and the city rating that would leave a vehicle exactly .2 MPG away from
each of the Gas Guzzler Tax notches, assuming that C(u) =  :634+:81H(u). For each of these starting points,
we calculated the increase in u necessary to reach the notch { these values range from .180 to .189 when  = 1
and from .214 to .221 when  = :81. Then, we tabulate the number of vehicles that are within .2 MPG of each
of these notches in the data, and use these tabulations as weights to create a single weighted average.
47Table 10: Estimates of Consumer Willingness to Pay for an Additional 1 MPG of City or
Highway Fuel Economy: 1998-2007
 = 1  = :81
du
G= the change in u required to move Gas Guzzler Tax .2 MPG .187 .220
du
H= the change in Highway Label resulting from change in u of du
G .146 .172
du
C= the change in City Label resulting from change in u of du
G .169 .160
BH= percentage of observations within du
H of Highway Label notches on preferred side .524 .505
BC= percentage of observations within du
C of City Label notches on preferred side .551 .552
Estimated value of Highway Label notch ((BH-.450)/.0136) $541 $402
Estimated value of City Label notch ((BC-.450)/.0136) $743 $752
Note: Estimates are based on data for passenger cars between 1998 and 2007. The estimated coecient on
notch value in specication 6 of table 4 is .0136.
typical driving behavior and average city versus highway mileage. Average mileage is 12,500
miles per year for thirteen years, which we divide between highway and city conditions using the
EPA estimate of 55% city and 45% highway. At a gasoline price of $2.50 and a 5% discount rate,
improving a vehicle's city fuel economy from 20.5 (the sample mean) to 21.5 has a value of $385
dollars, which is similar to our highway estimates, but only half our city estimates. Because
the cost saving is a nonlinear function of MPG, this calculation depends on the starting MPG
value. An improvement in the highway rating from 28.5 (the sample mean) to 29.5 has a value
of $165, which is much smaller than our estimates.
Overall, the fuel economy valuation implied by the amount of bunching observed between
label ratings and the Gas Guzzler Tax ratings implies a substantial consumer valuation of fuel
economy. Two important caveats are in order, however. First, the procedure used here does
not account for sales volume because we do not have sales data available for the label analysis.
Because vehicles subject to the Gas Guzzler Tax tend to be low volume, these estimates may
overstate the value of fuel economy. Second, as noted in the discussion of table 4, estimates
of the relationship between notch values and the degree of bunching are sensitive to the data
source. All of this implies considerable uncertainty around the estimates provided in table
10. Nevertheless, this exercise hopefully serves as an interesting example of how economic
parameters can be estimated from studying notches. At a minimum, the fact that automakers
bunch in label ratings at all suggests that consumers do value fuel economy.
488 Conclusion
Key aspects of American and Canadian vehicle fuel economy policy are designed with notches,
so that many vehicles face no incentive to incrementally improve fuel economy, but others face
large and varying incentives for improvement. In this paper we show that the policy notches
have real consequences, as there are signicantly more vehicles produced (and purchased) just
on the policy-benecial side of the notches than otherwise would be expected. We observe
this behavior not only in response to explicit notches in tax and subsidy policies, but also in
response to implicit \presentation notches," where government policy dictates what (coarse)
information a rm must provide to consumers. We develop a simple framework within which
the negative welfare eects of local manipulation can be calculated, a framework which may
prove useful in a variety of contexts as it can be utilized with only ex post data.
Future fuel economy policies are likely to increase the importance of notches. The state of
California recently explore a comprehensive feebate program with notches, and similar legisla-
tion has been introduced in the U.S. Senate. The EPA is considering the adoption of a letter
grade system with grading notches that would rate vehicles by fuel economy and emissions.
Recent CAFE reforms have dramatically tightened its standards in a way that increases the
value of moving vehicles over the light-truck classication notch. Policy notches may have ad-
ministrative or salience benets, but for notches to be warranted, these benets must outweigh
the substantial ineciency costs that we document here.
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51Not For Publication
A Additional Regression Tests
An alternative methodology for checking statistical signicance of bunching is to collapse the
data down to cell counts (e.g., gure 3) and then directly test whether the cell counts are
dierent, taking the counts as the primitive rather than the individual vehicle observations. In
the case of the Gas Guzzler Tax, collapsing in this way reduces the number of observations to
100, so this alternative methodology creates a statistical test based on 100 observations, rather
than the 1,221 observations that underlie it. For this reason, we think that the methodology
employed above is truer to the statistical signicance. The cell count regressions therefore
provide a harsher test of our hypothesis. For completeness, we provide here a summary of our
baseline regression tests on these variables.
Table 11 shows such count regressions for the Gas Guzzler Tax, city fuel economy labels and
highway fuel economy labels. Two specications are included for the Gas Guzzler Tax, where
the sales weighted cell counts are the dependent variable. Both include a full set of dummy
variables for each decimal rating, with .4 as the omitted category. Only the .5 decimal coecient
is reported for brevity, and it may be interpreted directly as the dierence between cell counts
for .5 decimal ratings and .4 decimal ratings. The rst column shows that the .5 decimals
have much larger cell counts in magnitude { the dummy coecient is larger than the constant,
implying that there are more than double the number of sales in .5 decimals than in .4 decimals
{ but this is not statistically signicant. The reason is that there is considerable variance due
to the shape of the distribution. Once that is controlled for with the rating polynomial, as in
column 2, the coecient becomes statistically signicant (though the magnitude changes little).
Table 11 provides similar cell count regressions for city and highway label distributions.
Because sales data are not available in the EPA data, these cell counts are unweighted. In both
cases, the sample is restricted to truncate the long tails of the distribution. Just as in the Gas
Guzzler Tax regressions, the coecients are large in magnitude when no polynomial is included,
52Table 11: Cell Count Regression Tests for Fuel Economy Ratings Bunching
Gas Guzzler Tax City Label Highway Label
Sales Sales Count Count Count Count
Decimal = .5 7189 6732*** 22.14 22.23*** 9.84 9.739*
(4674) (2177) (15.47) (5.612) (10.44) (5.722)
Constant 5768** 3.88E+06 55.57*** -1009 49.88*** 55.9
(2649) (1.268e+07) (8.352) (934.6) (6.489) (519.3)
Quintic Control Included? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Decimal Dummies Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 100 100 211 211 251 251
R2 0.064 0.675 0.015 0.902 0.01 0.759
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are cell counts, and the unit of observation
is an individual fuel economy rating (e.g., 18.1). All specications include a set of dummies for all decimal
values, with .4 as the omitted category. Specications may include a fth-order polynomial in the underlying
fuel economy rating as indicated by the quintic control row.
but they are statistically insignicant. Including the polynomial changes the coecients little,
but makes the estimates statistically signicant. Overall, these alternative specications sup-
port our hypothesis that there is fuel economy ratings bunching in response to both tax and
label notches.
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